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ABSTRACT
The Navy recruits a portion of its physician manpower directly from the civilian work force and
from medical residency programs. The Navy has had difficulty recruiting these doctors, called direct
appointment physicians, for the past 13 years. This study analyzes some of the pecuniary and
nonpecuniary aspects of physician recruitment in an effort to improve the recruitment process. A
regression model was estimated to establish a baseline projecting model for physician supply. The
results support the hypothesis that, if the pay gap between military and civilian physicians narrows
or if the number of recruiters increases, the number of direct appointment physicians accessed will
increase, all else constant. However, the changes necessary to increase the number of physicians
recruited are substantial. A survey was conducted to ascertain what nonpecuniary factors were
important to direct appointment physicians. Only one factor, patriotism, was indicated by a majority
of survey respondents as a reason for joining the Navy, and that was mentioned by only 51 .9 percent
of the respondents. The thesis recommends that additional data be collected to estimate a more robust
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The ability to recruit already qualified physicians, particularly
specialists, has to be considered one of the more difficult, if not
the most difficult recruiting program. (Lerro, et . al
.
, 1989)
Each year the Navy recruits a small portion of its total
physician manpower directly from the civilian work force as
well as from medical residency programs. These doctors,
called direct appointment physicians, are attractive to the
service because of their relatively lower cost when compared
to recruiting physicians from other sources. 1 The Navy
Recruiting Command (NAVCRUITCOM) and the Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery (BUMED) have been concerned about the recruitment
of direct appointment physicians because for several years the
Navy has not been able to recruit the numbers and types of
these doctors desired. This study will examine the
recruitment of direct appointment physicians in an effort to
identify potential problems in their recruitment and to
suggest possible solutions.
"The other sources of military physicians are the Armed Forces
Health Professions Scholarship Program and the School of Medicine
at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. The cost
per physician is higher through these sources because the programs
pay for the physician's medical education.
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis has several research objectives. Among these
are the following:
•1




To examine personal background information of
physicians brought in via the direct appointment program;
3 To specify and estimate a multivariate model to
predict the effectiveness of the various policy options
available to the Navy in the recruitment of physicians;
4. To survey direct appointment physicians about their
reasons for joining the Navy; and
5. To make sound recommendations for policy changes if
indicated by the data.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study will attempt to answer the following questions:
1. What are the current conditions in the market for Navy-
direct appointment physicians and what will future conditions
be?
2. How effective are the various recruiting tools (such
as medical recruiters, monetary incentives and advertising
campaigns)
?
3. What is the elasticity of physician supply with
respect to changes in these recruitment tools and incentive
programs?
4. What program levels and resources are necessary to
meet physician recruitment goals?
5. What are the primary reasons direct appointment
physicians join the Navy? In light of the survey results, are
changes needed to improve recruiting methods?
6. Are any changes to current policies indicated by the
information generated in this thesis?
II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. BACKGROUND
Since the end of the draft in 1973, all branches of the
Armed Services have had difficulty recruiting and retaining
the numbers and types of physicians needed (Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery, 1991) . Several factors besides the end of the
draft reduced the numbers of volunteer physicians. These
factors include the strong anti -military sentiment following
Vietnam, the shortages of physicians in the private sector and
the inferior pay offered to military physicians as compared to
their civilian counterparts (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
1991) . Because of these negative influences on recruitment,
the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program
(AFHPSP) and the School of Medicine at the Uniformed Services
University of Health Sciences (USUHS) were established to
provide medical training in exchange for obligated military
service (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1991) . The Navy
continued to recruit direct appointment physicians, but the
majority of physicians were accessed through the AFHPSP and
USUHS programs
.
In the 1980' s, although public support of the military
increased and military physicians' salaries improved, direct
appointment physicians remained difficult to recruit. Indeed,
as Table 1 shows, the Navy has not met its recruiting goals
for direct appointment physicians for the past eight years,
and it has met its goal only twice in the last 13 years (in
1981 and 1984) . The focus of this study is to review the
recruitment of direct appointment physicians in order to
improve future recruitment.










80 234 180 -54 76.92
81 75 106 +31 141.33
82 146 136 -10 93.15
83 204 167 -37 81.86
84 92 100 + 8 108.70
85 53 43 -10 81.13
86 23 21 -2 91.30
87 139 19 -120 13.67
88 150 84 -66 56.00
89 241 120 -121 49.79
90 189 118 -71 62.43
91 151 68 -83 45.03
92 99 51 -48 51.52
Source: Navy Recruiting Command
B. RECRUITING NAVY PHYSICIANS
Figure 1 displays the structure of the Navy Recruiting
Command. Individual Navy recruiters are assigned to Navy-
recruiting districts (NRD's or districts) throughout the
country. The NRD's report to Navy recruiting areas (NRA' s or
areas) , which report to the Navy Recruiting Command. Table 2
shows the organization of NRA' s and NRD's as of October 1992.
Over the years one NRA was absorbed by another area and
several NRD's have been absorbed by other districts in an
effort to consolidate and streamline Navy recruiting (see
Appendix A)
.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) assigns direct
appointment physician recruitment goals to the Navy Recruiting
Command (NAVCRUITCOM) . The Navy Recruiting Command then uses
a medical goaling model to assign goals to the five areas.
Each area's share of the total physician goal is determined by
the goaling model as a function of their share of the total
number of medical recruiters, their share of the physician
supply market and their share of past years' attainment
totals. Once assigned goals, the areas decide how to
distribute their goals among their recruiting districts.
Each area is assigned medical recruiters who recruit for
all the medical communities, including physicians. Most of










Navy Recruiting Command Organizational
hospital corpsmen. A few are medical service corps
officers. 2 Beginning in 1991, some general officer
recruiters were also designated to recruit physicians.
Direct appointment physicians occasionally are "recalled"
from the Navy reserve. They may be involuntarily recalled,
such as when the Navy exercises its option to recall
physicians to active duty due to specialty shortages. But
most are voluntary recalls. Typically, these physicians were
contacted by recruiters in their reserve units and asked if
Medical Service Corps officers are either in Health
Care Administration or Health Care Science. See Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery (1991) for more information.
Table 2
1992
NAVY RECRUITING AREAS AND DISTRICTS AS OF OCTOBER




































they were interested in returning to active duty. Physicians
in the Navy reserve are frequently more receptive to joining
than civilian physicians because they are aware of the
nonpecuniary aspects of both Navy and civilian employment and
have better information on which to weigh the decision of
practicing medicine in the two environments. However,
starting in Fiscal Year 1993, the reserve units themselves
vice recruiters will be recruiting recall physicians.
The Navy Recruiting Command's primary way of reaching
direct appointment physicians is via advertising. Navy
advertising for physicians has generally taken two forms-
-
print advertisements in professional magazines and direct
mailings to physicians. Both the print ads and the direct
mailings include a phone number where physicians can get more
information about the Navy. When physicians call the number,
they are referred to a recruiter in their area.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ECONOMIC THEORY
1. Regression Analysis
Suppose the number of physicians recruited by the Navy
each year could be better predicted if a comparison of
civilian and military physician salaries was conducted and if
the amount of money the Navy spent on advertising for
physicians was known. One method for testing this theory is
regression analysis. Regression analysis is a statistical
technique involving a regression equation with one dependent
variable and one or more independent variables. A regression
equation is used to determine if changes in a particular
dependent variable can be explained as a function of several
independent variables that represent causal factors. The
regression equation will reveal if the independent variables
are better predictors of the dependent variable than just
knowing the average value of the dependent variable. In this
example, the dependent variable equals the number of
physicians recruited each year and the independent variables
are average civilian physicians' annual income, average
military physicians' annual income and advertising dollars
spent per year. The next step is to collect data for several
years for Navy recruiting areas or districts and use this data
to estimate the regression model. The regression equation
will then indicate which independent variables are
statistically significant predictors of the number of
physicians the Navy is able to recruit. Of course, there are
several other considerations when using regression analysis.
There must be an adequate sample size and no multicollinearity
in the variables, among other things. Goldberg (19 82)
addresses the econometric issues associated with specifying
and estimating military manpower supply models in g: at
detail
.
The functional form that will be used for the
multivariate analysis of this thesis is the double log
transformation. The relationship between the dependent
10
variable and the independent variables used in this thesis is
not linear. The double log form is appropriate when it is
believed that elasticities, rather than the slopes, are
constant and that the underlying relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variable in question is
nonlinear. Chapter IV details the regression analysis used in
this study.
2 . Employee Choice of Employer
Economic theory suggests that when employees consider
whom to work for, they compare the salary and bonuses
(pecuniary factor) offered by various employers and the
nonpecuniary factors associated with each employer, such as
vacation time, work environment, and geographic location
(Goldberg, 19 82) . Based on individual tastes and preferences,
each employee chooses the employer who offers the best
combination of pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors. For
example, Person A and Person B may be considering employment
with two companies, Company Y and Company Z. Company Y offers
a high salary and is located in North Dakota. Company Z's
salary is considerably lower but is located in Florida.
Person A loves warmer weather, but decides the salary
outweighs the negative effect of the colder climate of North
Dakota. Person B prefers the warmer climate even if it means
considerably lower income. While overly simplistic, this
example demonstrates how individuals weigh the pecuniary and
11
nonpecuniary aspects of various employers and choose the one
that maximizes individual utility.
It is in this context that the decision made by
physicians to enter the Navy is explored. The individual
physician makes a decision where to work. In a broad sense
the physician chooses between the military and some form of
civilian employment. Consider first the pecuniary aspects of
these two "employers."
For civilian employment, the physician's net income is
his or her gross income minus expenses such as medical
malpractice insurance and medical equipment. The amount of
income as well as the malpractice rates vary with experience,
specialty and geographic location. Generally, physicians who
are self-employed earn more than those who are employees (of
a hospital or a health maintenance organization (HMO) , for
example) and those who are in non-solo practices earn more
than those in solo practices (Gonzales, 1992). Most HMO's
cover their physicians' medical expenses, such as malpractice
insurance and equipment (Thomas, 1990).
A military physician's income is a combination of
basic military pay and allowances (basic allowance for
quarters, basic allowance for subsistence, variable housing
allowance) as well as special medical pays (McMahon, et . al
.
,
19 89) . The amount of the basic pay and allowances varies by
pay grade and time in service. The special medical pays
include variable special pay (VSP) , additional special pay
12
(ASP) , board certified pay (BCP) , and incentive special pay
(ISP) (McMahon, et . al . , 1989). The VSP and BCP are
entitlements. All physicians receive VSP and all board
certified physicians receive BCP. The ASP and ISP are
discretionary payments requiring an additional year of
obligated service and my be denied for inadequate performance.
ISP varies by specialty and typically targets undermanned,
wartime- critical specialties.
Cooke (1990) discusses the Medical Officer Retention
Bonus (MORB) which was later replaced by the Multi-year
Specialty Pay (MSP) program (Hay, 1992) . MORB and MSP both
vary by specialty and by length of service obligation (two to
four years) . Insufficient information on these two programs
was obtained to include them in this analysis.
Currently, a large disparity exists between military
and civilian physician incomes (Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, 1988; Stone and Turner, 1992; Cooke,
1990; May, 19 88) . Table 3 provides an estimate of the pay gap
in 1993. The last column demonstrates that for every
specialty in 1993, military physicians earn only a portion of
what will be earned by equivalent civilian physicians. The
specialty that has the closest pay comparability between the
military and civilian sectors is family practice. A military
family practice physician will earn 91.71 percent of his or




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































disparity is for military surgical specialists who will earn
only 56.79 percent of what civilian surgeons will earn,
falling short by an estimated $100,857 in 1993. Clearly, the
pecuniary benefits of civilian employment outweigh those of
military service for these specialties.
Next, the nonpecuniary benefits of civilian and
military employment must be considered. There must be
nonpecuniary benefits to service in the Navy which, for some
people, are sufficient to outweigh the pecuniary advantages of
the private sector. Otherwise, no physician would choose
military service. Stone and Turner (1992) reviewed several
surveys of military physicians regarding their reasons for
joining and staying in the military. None of the surveys
Stone and Turner reviewed dealt specifically with reasons why
direct appointment physicians joined the military. Although
some of the studies surveyed direct appointment physicians,
direct appointment physicians make up only about 15 percent of
all Department of Defense physicians (General Accounting
Office, 1990). Thus, the sample sizes of direct appointment
physicians in these surveys are seldom sufficient to
distinguish the reasons why they enter the service.
The surveys in the review by Stone and Turner
consistently indicated funded education as a significant, if
not the most important, reason for joining the military. This
is not applicable to direct appointment physicians as they
fund their own medical education. The surveys also indicated
15
that patriotism, job challenge, lifestyle, and leadership and
professional development were important factors in physicians'
choices to join the military. Other factors mentioned as
influencing the decision were avoiding the hassles associated
with running a business, military income and benefits,
retirement and pursuing a specialty. But again, because
direct appointment physicians were not identified in these
surveys, it is difficult to say how they rate various
nonpecuniary factors in attracting them to the services.
Because the Navy has not been able to recruit the
number of physicians it needs, economic theory would suggest
that not enough physicians feel the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
benefits of military service outweigh the pecuniary and
nonpecuniary benefits of civilian employment. This suggests
two courses of action with respect to recruiting physicians.
First, the Navy can change the perspectives of doctors toward
the Navy by improving some of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
factors of Navy service. (Of course, these improvements will
only increase recruitment if the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
aspects of civilian employment remain the same.) And second,
the Navy can monitor and predict changes that may occur in the
makeup of the civilian pecuniary and nonpecuniary package.
Changes that improve the civilian pecuniary and nonpecuniary
package relative to the Navy package will call for improvement
on the Navy side to increase or maintain recruitment levels.
On the other hand, if the civilian package drops in total
16
value, Navy recruiting would theoretically benefit, as those
doctors on the margin who found the civilian package more
appealing may then choose military service. The next few
sections will examine some of these pecuniary and nonpecuniary
factors as they have related to the Navy in the past and as
they may relate to the Navy in the future.
3 . Supply and Demand
Economic theory of labor supply and demand, as
demonstrated by Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) , may provide a
useful framework for considering the pecuniary aspects of
employment. Figure 2 shows the standard supply and demand
curves for an industry that employs a particular occupation.
Generally, as the wage of that profession increases, the fewer
employees firms will want to hire. This is represented as the
downward sloping demand curve in Figure 2 . And generally
speaking, the higher the wages offered by the firms, the
greater the supply of individuals to the occupation. In a
free market economy, the forces of supply and demand will
reach a point of equilibrium as shown by point E in Figure 2.
Because supply equals demand, WE will be the going wage for
the occupation; the quantity hired will be QE .
The implications here for the comparative value of
pecuniary benefits can be seen by shifting the supply and
demand curves. Suppose the supply of labor to an occupation
increases from S ± to S 2 while the demand remains at D l7 as in
17
Figure 2 : Supply and Demand Curve
Figure 3. Because there are more individuals willing to enter
this occupation, the wages of the profession for the industry
will drop, as indicated by a lower equilibrium wage, from W
x
to W2 . In the same vein consider what happens if demand
increases and supply remains at S 1 , as in the shift from D x to
D 3 shown in Figure 3. In this case the equilibrium wage
increases from V!1 to W3 as firms compete to hire more
employees.
18
Figure 3 : Increase in Supply
Because the military has historically paid its physicians less
than their civilian counterparts, changes in supply and demand
of physicians are important factors in explaining recruiting
shortfalls. Figure 4 represents the military market w,M
represents the current military wage, which lies below the
equilibrium wage for the occupation. Thus, the quantity
needed (QD ) exceeds the quantity supplied (Qs ) . If supply
were to increase, as in Figure 5, then the new equilibrium
wage would move closer to the Navy wage and the shortfall
would drop to only QD -QS ' .
19
Figure 4: Market for Military Physicians
The degree of disparity between civilian and military
wages may be a major influence on recruitment in the next few
years. If supply increases, demand remains stable, and
civilian wages decrease, the Navy will benefit as more
physicians choose the military mix of pecuniary and
nonpecuniary benefits. If supply and demand increase at
roughly the same rate, physician recruitment will continue to
be difficult. If military (or market) demand grows faster
than supply, then recruitment of physicians will grow even
more difficult.
20
Figure 5: Increase in Supply
4. Projections of Supply and Demand
Generally, the literature agrees that the overall
supply of physicians has grown in the 1980 's and will continue
to grow through the year 2000 (Stone and Turner, 1992; U. S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1990; Kirchner, 19 89;
Kletke, et . al . , 1987; Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990). The
literature also agrees that the demand for physicians will
continue to increase (Stone and Turner, 1992; U. S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 1990; Kirchner, 1989; Schwartz
and Mendleson, 1990) . Disagreement arises in the literature
over the rate at which supply and demand will change and what
21
the overall effect will be on the market.
a . Supply
The supply of physicians in the late 1980 's and
early 1990 's shows few, if any, signs of a surplus as was
predicted in the early 1980 's (Stone and Turner, 1992;
Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990; Kirchner, 1989). In fact, the
literature discusses the recruiting efforts of health
maintenance organizations (HMO's), hospitals and physician
groups (Brown, 1991; Thomas, 1990; Kirchner, 1989; Schwartz
and Mendleson, 1990) . While the growth of the supply of
physicians roughly matched the predictions, the reason
frequently given for the lack of surplus is that demand for
physician services increased more than anticipated (Stone and
Turner, 1992; Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990).-
There is conflicting information on the current and
future conditions of the physician market with regard to
specialties. Stone and Turner (1992) identify surpluses in
primary care physicians such as general practitioners (GP)
,
pediatricians, obstetricians/gynecologists (OBGYN) and
internal medicine physicians, and shortfalls in surgical
specialists, anesthesiologists, neurologists, and
orthopedists. The U. S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS, 1990) points to future supply outpacing demand
for pediatricians, OBGYN and emergency medicine physicians
while demand will grow faster than supply for general
22
surgeons. DHHS data also indicate an oversupply of general
internist and family practice physicians, an adequate supply
of pediatricians and an oversupply of some nonprimary care
specialists, though they point to considerable uncertainty
about the market conditions in the future.
Kirchner (19 89) relays the opinions of various
specialties' professional organizations. As reported by
Kirchner, the American Society of Internal Medicine has had
second thoughts as to whether or not they had developed an
oversupply. The American Academy of Pediatrics reports an
oversupply but further points out that, should those children
from uninsured families receive medical coverage, then the
oversupply could swiftly be reversed. The American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology never accepted that a surplus might
be developing, especially given the reported 12 percent drop
in the number of physicians in their specialty who stopped
delivering babies due to the threat of medical malpractice
suits in the 1980' s. They further pointed to shortages of
OBGYN's all over the country. The American Academy of Family
Physicians reports an adequate supply.
Kirchner further reports that family practice,
internal medicine, and OBGYN physicians are in greatest demand
by recruiters. Thomas (1990), however, reports that in
physician groups and HMO's, the general surgeons are in "no
position to bargain" in today's market and that supply exceeds
demand for anesthesiologists, radiologists and pathologists.
23
The "hot" commodities for physician group and HMO recruiters
are primary care physicians, especially women, family
physicians, OBGYN's and internists. Thomas further says there
is moderate demand for pediatricians, a strong or growing
demand for general surgeons, orthopedists, and cardiologists,
and a shortage of board certified or board eligible emergency
medicine specialists.
While these reports were issued in different years,
there are too many opposing positions to draw any strong
conclusions about the future of various specialties. While
accurately predicting these changes in supply by specialty
could be very helpful to the Navy in recruiting the numbers
and types of physicians desired, the lack of consensus would
no doubt make any projections unreliable and could hurt
recruiting efforts more than help them.
There are several factors that could cause the
supply of physicians to grow more slowly than currently
projected. Medical malpractice is one important factor.
Glazer (1991) reports that the rapidly increasing malpractice
insurance premiums of the early 1980 's have stabilized in
recent years. But Glazer further points to a study that
indicates only one in eight patients injured by medical
negligence actually files a lawsuit. Brennan, et. al .
,
(1991)
makes the point that the negligence found in the study would
have lead to successful litigation under the current tort
system, had the patients filed suit. If those who are truly
24
injured begin filing lawsuits in substantial numbers and
malpractice insurance costs increase substantially as a
result, then physician supply could decrease as the higher
premiums drive current doctors out of medicine.
Another issue that could slow the growth of
physician supply is the effort to contain health care costs,
which is an important item on President Clinton's agenda
(Stout, 1993). These efforts might include rationing of
health care and restricting the charges for physician
services, and could therefore decrease the supply as the
pecuniary benefits of becoming a physician decrease (Schwartz
and Mendleson, 1990) . On the other hand, they might take the
form of limiting jury awards for personal damages in law suits
(Glazer, 1991) . This might make malpractice insurance less
costly and encourage growth in physician supply.
Another factor that could decrease the supply of
physicians is a change in the retirement pattern of
physicians. There seems to be a trend toward earlier
retirement, possibly due to such things as increasing
malpractice rates, the complexity of third party payment
structures such as Medicare and Medicaid, competitive
pressures in the market place (particularly from HMO's) and
because the physicians can afford to retire sooner (Stone and
Turner, 1992; Kirchner, 1989)
.
Yet another factor that may decrease the supply is
the length of the workweek for physicians. Many have
25
theorized that the average physician work week will decrease
as more women and young physicians enter the market because
previous studies have shown that women physicians work shorter
workweeks than men and because younger physicians want a more
relaxed lifestyle (Thomas, 1990; Kirchner, 1989). A shorter
workweek would reduce the supply of physician services and
lower the growth of physician supply. Stone and Turner
(1992) , however, point to a study that did not show any
notable decrease in hours worked each week by physicians
during the period from 1984 to 1991.
As shown in Table 4, the number of institutions
conferring medical degrees and the number of medical degrees
conferred have been fairly consistent since 1982, although
there has been a small, steady decrease in degrees conferred
starting in 1986. A continuing decline in degrees conferred
lowers the supply of physicians.
Table 4: NUMBER OF DEGREES IN MEDICINE CONFERRED 19 82-1988









15814 15484 15813 16041 15938 15620 15091
Source: Derived from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991.
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Recent years have seen increases in the amount of
debt incurred by students attending medical school (Stone and
Turner, 1992) . Increasing medical school costs may result in
lower future enrollment and thus a slower growing supply.
i>. Demand
The literature is generally in agreement that the
demand for physician services will increase. There is also
agreement as to why this will occur. The first factor is the
projected growth of the U. S. population (Stone and Turner,
1992; Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990; DHHS, 1990; Kirchner,
19 89) . A larger population leads to greater demand for
physician services. Another factor that will increase demand
is the aging of the population; this will increase demand
because as people age, they require more frequent and more
intensive medical care (Stone and Turner, 1992; Schwartz and
Mendleson, 1990; DHHS, 1990; Kirchner, 1989) . A third
frequently reported factor is the rise in the number of cases
of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) . Those with AIDS
will receive treatment from physicians (Stone and Turner,
1992; Schwartz and Mendleson, 199 0; DHHs, 1990; Kirchner,
19 89) , and additionally, many of those who are uninfected will
visit their physicians for testing and information (DHHS,
1990)
.
Even prior to the 1992 presidential election, the
idea of providing access to health care to the estimated ten
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to fifteen percent of the American population currently
uninsured was an issue (DHHS, 1990) . If those who are
uninsured begin receiving medical care, the demand for
physicians will increase (Stone and Turner, 1992; DHHS, 1990;
Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990; Kirchner, 1989). Because
President Clinton has made health coverage for all Americans
one of the major priorities of his administration (Stout,
1993), such coverage seems more likely now than ever before.
Another influence on supply is recent technological
advancement. New technology now allows faster treatment at a
lower cost, making procedures more accessible to more people
and thus increasing demand for physician services (Stone and
Turner, 1992; Schwartz and Mendleson, 1990; Kirchner, 1989)
.
There were other, less frequently mentioned issues
in the literature that also may influence the demand for
physician services. The increase in the number of people
eligible for the Medicare and Medicaid programs has expanded
demand for physicians since the 1960's; the growth in
eligibility is expected to continue, which would serve to
increase demand (Stone and Turner, 1992) . Projections are
that real personal income of Americans will continue to rise;
a rise in real personal income increases the demand for
physician care (Stone and Turner, 1992; Kirchner, 1989). On
the other hand, the current trend toward increasing the amount
of health insurance deductibles and coinsurance payments could
decrease demand, as the additional costs make people think
28




The decrease in the numbers of direct appointment
physicians recruited in 1991 and 1992 may have been a result
of media coverage during Desert Storm. Scott (1991) and Gomez
(1990) relay examples of the financial problems of medical
reservists during the Gulf War. Coverage of financial
hardships of medical reservists was also broadcast on network
and cable television. While these stories of lost earnings
involved reservists, they may emphasize more dramatically the
financial differences between the wages of military and
civilian physicians, thus hurting recruiting of direct
appointment physicians.
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III. DIRECT APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS FROM 19 81 TO 1992
A. THE DATA BASE
To better understand the recruitment of direct appointment
physicians, the background, characteristics of those physicians
who have entered the Navy in past years is examined.
NAVCRUITCOM' s Personalized Officer Recruiting and Tracking
System (PORTS) database 3
,
which contains information on all
the direct appointment physicians recruited in fiscal years
1981 through 1992 was used to profile the background of
recruited physicians. The following variables are included in
the database:
1. A three-digit code representing the Navy recruiting
district from which the physician was recruited (see Table 2,
Chapter II, for NRD codes)
;
2. the fiscal year recruited;
3. gender;
4. race;
5. date of birth;
3 NAVCRUITCOM uses the PORTS data base to track Navy
applicants and recruits.
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6. whether or not the physician had prior military
service, and if so, the branch of service; and
7. the employment status of physicians recruited (i. e.,
in school, looking for first job, employed, unemployed)
.
The age at which a physician was recruited will be an
important background characteristic. Because the date
commissioned was not available, each physician's age at entry
was estimated using the member's date of birth and the fiscal
year in which the member was recruited. The entry ages were
grouped into five-year increments before examining the data.
Because the current recruiting areas are different from
the recruiting areas during the years of this data, a
modification was made to account for this. This modification
realigned the old structure so that the area and districts
that no longer exist fall under their current area and
district. See Appendix A for how this realignment was done.
The first digit of the NRD code, which corresponds with the
recruiting area, was used to derive the recruiting area.
Because PORTS includes those who applied but were not
accessed, only those who were actually commissioned will be
examined below.
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B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PORTS DATA
Table 5 displays the number of Navy direct appointment
physicians accessed each year by area, as reflected by the
PORTS database. The final row of the table reflects the
official NAVCRUITCOM recruitment figures for each year. The
PORTS data used in this portion of the analysis does not
accurately reflect NAVCRUITCOM' s official numbers for two
reasons. First, any observations with obvious errors were
deleted from the data used in the thesis. Second, some
observations were missing the final action code. Personnel
with a missing final action code were matched with a listing
from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Management Information
System (BUMIS) data file4 of direct appointment physicians in
the Navy from 1985 to 1991. This yielded three additional
observations. For the most part, the annual totals are off by
only one or two people with the following exceptions- -the 1990
PORTS total is eight people short of the NAVCRUITCOM total, or
6.78 percent, and the 1991 total is 18 people, or 26.47
percent, short. Despite these problems, the PORTS data is
still useful in profiling the background characteristics of
direct appointment physicians over the past 12 years.





































C. PROFILE OF NAVY DIRECT APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS RECRUITED
The most striking feature of Table 5 is how dramatically
the total number of physicians accessed has fluctuated during
this time period. The high occurs in 19 83 at 167 and the low
at 19 in 1987. No clear pattern emerges. Table 1 in Chapter
II showed that the Navy missed its recruiting goal of direct
appointment physicians almost every year during this period.
1. Area Results by Fiscal Year
Over the 12 -year period, Area One has yielded the
largest percentage of direct appointment physicians, 26.27
percent, while Area Five has produced the least, 14.19 percent
of the total. Each area's share of the total annual
recruitment, as well as the actual numbers, has varied greatly
across the years. Generally speaking, the numbers all went
down and up in the same years. Goals were low in 1985 and
1986 (53 and 23 respectively) , but when the goal rose to 139
in 1987, attainment across all areas was low and only totaled
19 for the year. The totals increased in 1989 and 1990, but
dropped again in 1991 and 1992. This may have been due to the
media attention on the disparity between military and civilian




Gender by Fiscal Year
Table 6 displays the number of Navy direct appointment
physicians recruited by gender for each fiscal year. The
percentage of physicians recruited who are women varied from
a low of 9.09 percent in 1985 to a high of 17.31 percent in
1992. The average annual percentage was 13.79 percent.
Although no clear pattern emerges as to what might affect the
percentage of female direct appointment physicians, the
percentage of females is consistently higher in the last seven
years of the period compared to the first five years.
3 . Race by Fiscal Year
Table 7 displays Navy direct appointment physicians by
race for each fiscal year from 1981 to 1992. The racial
composition also varies from year to year. In 1985 none of
the 44 physicians accessed were black. In 1986, none of the
21 accessed were Asian or other minority, and in 1987, of the
18 recruited, only one was a minority (Asian) . The largest
accession of blacks occurred in 1983, when blacks made up
11.3 8 percent of direct appointment physicians. The highest
rate for Asians was 6.36 percent in 1990. On average, Asians
made up 3.29 percent; blacks, 6.69 percent; other minorities,
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Table 8 displays the number of Hispanic direct
appointment physicians accessed by the Navy. This number is
broken out separately from the race variable because
Hispanics, as an ethnic group, can belong to more than one
race category. During 1986 and 1987, when total accessions
and goals were extremely low, there were no Hispanics
accessed. The high was in 1988, when 10.84 percent of the
accessions were Hispanic. The overall annual average for the
12
-year period was 5.99 percent.
4. Prior Military Service
Table 9 displays the incidence of prior military
service of Navy direct appointment physicians. A majority,
54.3 percent, had no prior military service. And, as might be
expected, of the 45.8 percent with prior military service,
most had been affiliated with the Navy- -15.5 percent had
served in the Naval Reserve and 12 . 6 percent had served on
active duty in the Navy. Quite a few had Army and Air Force
service; almost nine percent had been affiliated with the Army
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Table 9 : INCIDENCE OF PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE OF NAVY DIRECT
APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS ACCESSED, FISCAL YEARS 1981 TO 1992
Prior Service Frequency Percent
No Prior Service 544 54.3
Army Active Duty 45 4.5
Army Reserve 44 4.4
Navy Active Duty 126 12.6
Navy Reserve 155 15.5









Air Force Reserve 20 2.0
Air Force Retired 1 0.1
Coast Guard 3 0.3






Source: Navy Recruiting Command, PORTS database
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5. Employment Status at Accession
Table 10 displays the employment status of Navy direct
appointment physicians prior to entering the Navy. The vast
majority, 82.1 percent, were employed. The next largest
group, 8.3 percent, were still in school, while only 2.3
percent reported being unemployed. The employment status of
5.5 percent of the observations was "unknown" or "other."
This could significantly affect any conclusions drawn from
Table 10 if those in the "unknown" employment status actually
fall into one of the categories listed.
Table 10: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF NAVY DIRECT APPOINTMENT
PHYSICIANS ACCESSED FROM FISCAL YEARS 19 81 TO 1992
Employment Status Frequency Percent
Employed 821 82.0
In School 83 8.3




Enlisted Regular 2 0.2
Other / Unknown 55 5.5
Total 1001
Source: Navy Recruiting Command, PORTS database.
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6 . Age at Accession
The approximate age at which direct appointment
physicians joined the Navy is listed in Table 11. The
majority of physicians- - 60 . 7 percent- -joined before the age of
40. Table 12 breaks the physicians into those who joined
before and those who joined after the age of 45; 22.9 percent
joined after the age of 45. This is of interest because those
who joined after age 45 with insufficient prior service will
not have reached the 2 years of service required to be
eligible for retirement by age 65, the normal age of mandatory
separation.
D. SUMMARY
Though comprised primarily of white males, direct
appointment physicians are frequently females and minority
officers, as well. Almost half have had prior military
experience, and most with prior service had bee affiliated
with the Navy. Almost all direct appointment physicians were
employed or in school, and most entered before the age of 45.
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Table 11: APPROXIMATE AGE OF NAVY DIRECT APPOINTMENT









25 - 29 149 14.9 149 14.9
30 - 34 267 26.7 416 41.6
35 - 39 192 19.2 608 60.7
40 - 44 143 14.3 751 75.0
45 - 49 95 9.5 846 84.5
50 - 54 71 7.1 917 91.6
55 - 59 64 6.4 981 98.0
60 - 64 20 2.0 1001 100.0
Total 1001
Source: Navy Recruiting Command, PORTS database.
Table 12: NUMBER OF NAVY DIRECT APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS
ACCESSED AFTER THE AGE OF 45 FROM 1981 TO 1992
Age Frequency Percent
45 or younger 772 77.1
over 45 229 22.9
Total 1001
Source: Navy Recruiting Command, PORTS database
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IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
As discussed in Chapter II, a regression analysis can help
predict what factors affect the number of direct appointment
physicians the Navy is able to recruit. This chapter will
discuss some of the pecuniary and other quantifiable factors
that theoretically could affect the number of direct
appointment physicians accessed. The chapter also will
discuss how these factors were converted into variables for
use in a regression equation. Finally, it will discuss the
results of the regression equation.
A. MODEL SPECIFICATION
The equation below expresses the number of direct
appointment physicians the Navy is able to recruit as a
function of several factors. Above each factor is its
expected sign.
+ + +
NAVYDRS = f (CIVINCOME, CIVMALPRAC, MILINCOME, DRPOP,
+ + -




NAVYDRS = Number of Navy direct appointment physicians
recruited
CIVINCOME = Net income of civilian physicians
MILINCOME = Net income of military physicians
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CIVMALPRAC = Civilian personal malpractice liability
DRPOP = Number of physicians in military supply market
NAVYADVERT = Advertising directed at direct appointment
physicians
MEDRCRTS = Number of Navy medical recruiters
DESERTSTORM = Before or after operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM (negative effect on dependent variable after DESERT
SHIELD/STORM)
The first three independent variables (CIVINCOME,
CIVMALPRAC, MILINCOME) are pecuniary factors. As civilian
income increases, it is expected that fewer physicians would
join the Navy, if all else were held constant. And all else
held constant, if civilian malpractice rates increase, more
physicians would be expected to join the Navy. Conversely, if
military income increases, more physicians would be expected
to join the Navy, again all other factors held constant.
The next variable (DRPOP) is included because, as the
quantity of available physicians increases, it is expected
that recruiting would become easier and possibly more
physicians to join the Navy, all else held constant. This
variable may be closely linked to the civilian income variable
because, as discussed in Chapter II, as the overall supply of
physicians increases, generally civilian income levels should
decrease. If there is a strong correlation between the two
variables, there may be a problem with multicollinearity in
the regression model. This could cause the variables to
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appear insignificant even though they add to the significance
of the equation.
The remainder of the variables are not items that directly
affect the mix of pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors. They
may, however, affect the way in which the physician views the
mix of pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors. For instance,
because Navy advertising increases awareness of Navy medical
programs and provides a way for physicians to obtain more
information, increases in the amount of advertising may
increase the number of physicians recruited, all else held
constant. Likewise, by increasing the number of medical
recruiters, more personnel are available to explain Navy
medicine to potential recruits and thus attract more
physicians, all else held constant. As discussed in Chapter
II, the publicity surrounding Desert Storm focused attention
on the disparity between civilian and military physician
wages. This publicity pointed out the pecuniary disadvantages
of naval service, thereby decreasing the number of physicians
recruited after Desert Storm, all else held constant.
The variables listed are certainly not all the factors
that affect the number of physicians that come into the Navy.
Even if all the factors that affect recruitment were known,
they could not all be quantified. Nonetheless, the variables
included are consistent with previous studies of enlistment
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supply and capture a significant number of important factors.
Since parsimony is an important attribute of forecasting
models, the hope is that this model will provide a reliable
forecasting tool.
B. ESTIMATING THE REGRESSION MODEL
This thesis uses data from 1981 to 1992. These years are
far enough removed from the start of the all -volunteer force
to reflect the current nature of physician recruitment, while
at the same time providing data that more accurately reflect
recent recruitment practices. This thesis also uses the
current recruiting area configuration as the basis for each
observation (see Appendix A for more information) . This
results in 60 usable observations. The reason for using
recruiting areas is discussed below. Because perfect data do
not always exist or are not always accessible, proxy variables
will be used for the theoretical variables that the regression
models try to capture.
1. Measures of Civilian Net Income and Malpractice
Insurance Rates
Ideally, in estimating the civilian variables,
information on average civilian income and malpractice rates
by county would be used, and these figures would be matched to
the corresponding Navy recruiting districts to see how changes
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in income and malpractice affect recruiting by district.
Unfortunately, data on civilian income and malpractice rates
were not available at the county or even the state level; the
smallest level available was the census division level. Thus,
the census divisions were matched as closely as possible with
the recruiting areas to create proxy variables for civilian
physicians' annual average net income and malpractice
liability.
To determine how far off this match was, the PORTS
data and official NAVCRUITCOM attainment figures, after being
realigned as indicated in Appendix A, were matched to census
divisions to see if physicians may have been influenced by a
proxy variable other than their source recruiting area. Table
13 outlines the states that comprise the census divisions and
Table 14 outlines the states that comprise the recruiting
districts. Table 15 shows how the states in the recruiting
areas in Table 14 roughly line up with the states of the
census divisions shown in Table 13. However, there are some
major differences between the census divisions and the
recruiting areas.
Table 16 outlines the gaps between the recruiting
district data and the census division data. Seven hundred
forty- seven physicians were in a recruiting area that match :d
up perfectly with the proxy variable. In other words, these
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Table 13 STATES IN EACH CENSUS DIVISIONS
Census Division States




Middle Atlantic New York, Pennsylvania
New Jersey





East South Central Kentucky, Tennessee
Mississippi, Alabama
West South Central Oklahoma, Arkansas
Texas, Louisiana
East North Central Wisconsin, Michigan
Illinois, Indiana
Ohio











Source: Derived from U.S. Bureau of
the Census
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Table 14: STATES WHICH MAKE UP THE NAVY RECRUITING AREAS
Area States
One Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island
Vermont, Virginia (2 counties)
West Virginia (25 counties)
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York
Ohio (4 counties) , Pennsylvania
Three Alabama, Florida, Georgia
Indiana (20 counties)
Kentucky (99 counties)




West Virginia (26 counties)
Five Iowa, Illinois (41 counties)
Indiana (5 counties) , Michigan
Minnesota, North Dakota, Nebraska
Ohio (83 counties) , Wisconsin
Kentucky (11 counties) , South Dakota
West Virginia (4 counties)
Seven Tennessee (21 counties) , Texas
Arkansas, Illinois (57 counties)
Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri
Mississippi, Kentucky (10 counties)
Oklahoma
Eight Alaska, Arizona, California
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada
Oregon, Utah, Washington
Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico
Source: Derived from Navy Recruiting
Command
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5 East North Central
West North Central
7 West South Central
8 Mountain
Pacific
Table 16: GAPS BETWEEN THE RECRUITING AREA AND THE AREA'S













7 81 34 31
8 217 40
Totals 747 223 31
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747 physicians were theoretically influenced by the average
net income and malpractice liability insurance indicated by
the area's proxy variable. Thirty- one physicians were in one
recruiting area but the proxy variable that influenced their
choice to join was based on a different recruiting area. Two
hundred twenty- three of the physicians may or may not have
been influenced by the proxy variable for their recruiting
area.
Table 17 looks more closely at these 223 physicians.
Table 17 lists the NRD number, the number of physicians
recruited from this NRD, the number of counties in this NRD
that lie in the proxy census area and the number of counties
that do not. NRD's 314, 316, 518 and 734 all have a large
majority of their counties within the proxy census region.
More than likely, the 82 physicians in these NRD's made their
decisions based on the recruiting area's proxy variable. Of
the remaining districts, NRD 120 and NRD 825 encompass a
majority of the counties in the proxy census region while
NRD's 119, 747 and 830 do not contain a majority in the proxy
census region. So of the 223, there is a strong chance that
141 of these physicians may not have been influenced by the
proxy variable used for their recruiting area.
The values used for civilian physician net income and
malpractice liability for 1982 to 1991 were taken from
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Gonzalez (1987, 1989, 1992). The values for 1981 and 1992
were estimated using an extrapolation based on a linear
regression for the years 1982 to 1991.
Table 17: BREAKDOWN OF 223 PHYSICIANS WHO MAY NOT BE WITHIN









119 74 13 30
120 13 37 28
314 16 204 19
316 28 167 1
518 18 58 15
734 20 74 4
747 14 10 112
825 25 81 36
830 15 35 69
Source: Derived from Navy
Recruiting Command
2. Estimated Military Income
As stated earlier, military physician income is a
combination of military basic pay and allowances (such as BAQ,
BAS and VHA) and of medical special pays (such as ISP, VSP,
ASP and BCP) . This section discusses how proxy variables were
constructed for use in the regression equation.
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a. Military Base Pay and Allowances
The first step used in estimating military basic
pay and allowances was to calculate the characteristics of the
average Navy physician in order to construct the proxy values.
Using the 1985 rank structure, length of service and marital
status data provided by Whalen (19 86) , the average Navy-
physician was estimated to be a married LCDR with seven years
of service. While the estimated rank and length of service
used 19 85 stocks, it should be fairly representative of the
entire time frame, as manning authorizations do not change
dramatically from year to year. Whalen' s data was compared to
more current BUMIS data that corroborated the assumption of
the average Navy physician being a LCDR with seven years of
service.
The basic pay, BAQ (with dependents) and BAS values
for a LCDR with over six years of service were used to
estimate the average Navy physician's basic pay and
allowances. No proxy variable was used for VHA. A VHA
estimate would greatly enhance the reliability of this
analysis. But because no VHA proxy was readily available and
because it would be difficult to estimate VHA given the wide
variation among the hundreds of geographic locations where
physicians can be assigned, no proxy variable was used for
VHA. The sources for the amount of basic pay, BAQ and BAS
54
were the Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (1987) for fiscal years 1981 to 1987, and the Navy
Times (1988, 1989, 1990, 1991) for the fiscal years 1988 to
1992.
b. Medical Special Pays
The medical special pays are based on years of
medical experience rather than years of service. GAO (19 90)
data was used to compute years of experience. GAO stated
that, on average, physicians in the Department of Defense have
10 years of experience, including post-graduate training. The
distribution of Navy physicians was broken down by experience
as indicated in Table 18. Because the average years of
experience within the year groupings were not available, the
median age of the category was used to estimate the overall
Table 18:
EXPERIENCE





0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21 +
33 34 16 12 6
Source: Derived from GAO (199 0)
average years of experience. For the 21 -and- over group, no
upper bound was given. Because mandatory retirement is
55
normally at 30 years of service, 30 years was used as an upper
bound and 2 5.5 years was used as the median age for the 21-
and-over category. Using these numbers, the average physician





(1989) was used as a source for VSP, ASP, ISP and BCP
amounts from fiscal years 1981 to 1989. The Chief of Naval
Operations (19 89) was used as a source for ISP amounts from
fiscal years 1989 to 1992, and the Secretary of the Navy
(1990) was used for VSP, ASP, and BCP amounts from 1990 to
1992.
It is reasonable to assume that a LCDR with nine
years of medical experience has finished a residency, has not
become an executive/managerial medical officer (Whalen, 1986)
,
and is therefore receiving VSP, BCP, ISP and ASP. ISP was
computed using the inventory of Navy specialists provided by
May, et. al .
,
(1988) to approximate the composition of
specialists. Then, an annual average ISP was computed by
multiplying the percent of specialists by the amount of ISP
received by each specialty in that year. As discussed in
Chapter II, not enough information on MORB or MSP was obtained
to add such data to this regression equation. An average
annual military physician income was constructed by adding




3. Estimating the Physician Market
The physician market was estimated for the years 1981,
1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1989 using the total nonfederal
physician population by state provided in Roback, et . al .
,
(1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990, and 1992) . The physician
market by state was estimated for the years 1982, 1984, and
1987 by taking the average population of the years before and
after the missing years. The years 1990 to 1992 were
estimated using an extrapolation based on a linear regression
for the years 1981 to 1989. Table 19 presents the states that
were used as the proxy variables for each recruiting areas'
physician population.
4. Estimating Navy Advertising
Data were obtained on advertising costs from 1988 to
1992. Because the advertising data were not available for all
of the recruiting years, it was beneficial to estimate the
amounts spent from 19 81 to 19 87. The amount spent on
advertising directed at direct appointment physicians is
usually based on a combination of the total amount of money
available for Navy advertising and the recruiting goals for
physicians. Because no data were obtained on the amount of
money available for Navy advertising, a simple correlation
between the goals and the amount of advertising money spent
was conducted. This revealed a strong, negative correlation;
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Table 19: STATES USED TO ESTIMATE RECRUITING AREA PHYSICIAN
POPULATION
Area States
1 Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts
Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
Rhode Island, Vermont
3 Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky
North Carolina, South Carolina
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
5 Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska
Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois
7 Texas, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana
Missouri, Mississippi, Oklahoma
8 Alaska, Wyoming, Arizona, Colorado
California, New Mexico, Hawaii, Idaho
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah
Washington
in other words, as the goals increased, the amount spent on
physician advertising went down. Since no reliable estimate
for advertising dollars spent on physician recruitment could
be made, an advertising proxy variable was not used.
5. Estimating Navy Medical Recruiters
The Navy Recruiting Command provided the number of
nurse corps recruiters, medical service corps recruiters,
hospital corpsman recruiters, and general officer recruiters
designated as medical recruiters for the years 1983 to 1992
for each recruiting area. Because there were very few changes
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in the composition and number of recruiters from 19 83 through
1985, these years were used to estimate the number of medical
recruiters in 1981 and 1982. As discussed in Chapter II, "the
designated medical general officer recruiter" was introduced
in 1991.
Two more variables were created to ascertain if the
total number of physicians recruited responded to the total
number of medical recruiters as well as the numbers of the
different types of medical recruiters. One of these variables
combined all four types of medical recruiters while the second
variable left out the general officer recruiters who were
designated for medical recruiting. These general officer
recruiters were omitted from the second variable because that
program was only in effect for two of the 12 years covered by
the recruiting data.
6. Estimating the Effect of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM
Because Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM did not begin
until August 1990, near the end of the fiscal year, the years
1981 to 1990 are considered pre-DESERT SHIELD/STORM and 1991
and 1992 are considered post -DESERT SHIELD/STORM for the
purposes of this thesis. A dummy variable was created which




Because collinearity between explanatory variables might
cause problems in the regression analysis, a correlation
procedure was run on the variables. As stated earlier, a
correlation might be expected between the number of physicians
in an area and the net income of the area. This does not
appear to be a problem, however, as the two variables were not
strongly correlated (correlation coefficient = .0421).
However, the pecuniary variables, military income, civilian
income, and malpractice liability, were all highly correlated.
Table 20 lists the correlations between the three pay
variables. Because civilian net income already incorporates
the cost of malpractice liability, the liability variable was
Table 20: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN NET INCOME,



















dropped from consideration. Because the civilian and military
incomes were so highly correlated, a single variable was
created to measure the effect of changes in either one. The
new variable is the pay gap (or difference) between civilian
and military pay. As the pay gap increases, the number of
physicians recruited could be expected to decrease.
Several regressions were estimated. All used the double
-
log transformation as discussed in Chapter II. In some of the
regressions, the pecuniary variables and the recruiter
variables were not combined, as detailed above. In other
regressions, the variables that combined the pecuniary and
recruiter variables were all used. And other regressions used
combinations of both the various categories of variables.
When the pecuniary variables were not in their combined form,
the R2 value of the equation was stronger, but the variables
did not have the expected signs. When one variable was used
for the pecuniary variables vice the three variables, the
single variable had the expected sign.
The three regression models that will be described in
further detail are listed below.
Model 1:
LNNAVYDRS = LNCIVMILINC + LNDRPOP + LNTMEDREC1 + DESERT
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Model 2:
LNNAVYDRS = LNCIVMILINC + LNDRPOP + LNTMEDREC2 + DESERT
Model 3:
LNNAVYDRS = LNCIVMILINC + LNDRPOP + LNNCR + LNMSCR + LNHMR +
GENOFFMEDR + DESERT
Where:
LNNAVYDRS = The natural log of the number of Navy physicians
recruited by area per year
LNCIVMILINC = The natural log of the value given when the
military income per year is subtracted from average
civilian income by area per year
LNDRPOP = The natural log of the number of physicians in an
area per year
LNNCR = The natural log of nurse corps recruiters by area per
year
LNMSCR = The natural log of medical service corps recruiters
by area per year
LNHMR = The natural log of hospital corpsmen recruiters by
area per year
GENOFFMEDR = General officer recruiters designated as medical
recruiters by area by year. Note: This is not a natural
log as the value of this variable from 1981 to 1990 was
zero.
LNTMEDREC1 = The natural log of the total number of medical
recruiters by area per year
LNTMEDREC2 = The natural log of the total number of medical
recruiters after subtracting the general officer
recruiters by area per year
DESERT = for years 1981 to 1990 (pre-DESERT STORM) and
equal to 1 for years 1991 and 1992 (post-DESERT STORM)
Tables 21, 22 and 23 provide the results of the above
regression equations. One feature of these regressions is the
low R2 and adjusted R2 values. The explanatory variables do
not predict much of the variation in the number of Navy direct
appointment physicians recruited. However, low R2 s seem to be
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a common feature of cross -sectional data. Moreover, except
for the LNDRPOP variable in Model 3, the signs of all the
variables are as expected. The LNCIVMILINC variable is
significant at the .1 level in all three equations. The
LNTMEDREC1 and LNTMEDREC2 variables were both significant at
the .1 level. However, when broken down by the types of
recruiters in Model 3, only the LNNCR variable was significant
at the .1 level, while LNHMR had the wrong sign (although it
was not significant)
.
Table 21: MODEL 1 REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent Variable: LNNAVYDRS
F - Statistic: 2.227
Probability F: .0779
R - Square Value: .1394
Adjusted R - Square Value: .0768
Sample Size = 60





LNCIVMILINC - .727* -1.882
LNDRPOP .001 .001
DESERT - .770 -1.448
* Significant at the .1 level
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Table 22: MODEL 2 REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent Variable: LNNAVYDRS
F - Statistic: 2.085
Probability F: .0951
R - Square Value: .1317
Adjusted R - Square Value: .0685
Sample Size = 60





LNCIVMILINC - .718* -1.850
LNDRPOP .059 .154
DESERT - .195 - .531
* Significant at the . 1 level
Because the Navy can theoretically change the amount of
income it pays its physicians, a calculation was performed to
determine how much the pay gap would have to decrease in order
to access 25 more direct appointment physicians annually,
using the average annual number of physicians recruited from
19 81 to 1992. Using Model 1, the pay gap would have to narrow
by 39.95 percentage points. Using Model 2, the pay gap would
have to decrease by 40.45 percentage points, and using Model
3, the gap would have to decrease by 31.57 percentage points.
These are fairly large reductions, which would require a
significant raise in military pay.
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Table 23 MODEL 3 REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent Variable: LNNAVYDRS
F - Statistic: 1.731
Probability F: .1221
R - Square Value: .1890
Adjusted R - Square Value: .0798
Sample Size = 60






LNHMR - .921 -1.300
GENOFFMEDR .064 .591
LNDRPOP - .361 - .619
LNCIVMILINC - .920* -1.680
DESERT -1.148 - .644
* Significant at the . 1 level
The Navy can also increase the number of recruiters,
according to these three regressions, in order to increase
recruitment. Using Model 1, the total number of medical
recruiters would have to increase by 2 6.4 percent to recruit
25 more physicians. Using 1992 levels, this would equate to
an increase of 50 medical recruiters. Using Model 2, which
excludes general officer recruiters, the number of medical
recruiters must increase by 3 0.0 percent to increase the
number of recruits by 25. Again, using 1992 levels, this
would mean an increase of 33 recruiters. In Model 3, the
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number of nurse recruiters would have to increase by 46.17
percent to recruit 25 more physicians. This would mean 16
more nurse corps recruiters, using 1992 recruiter levels. The
Navy could also use a combination of the above two changes to
increase the number of direct appointment physicians
recruited.
The variables in Model 1 were used to form another
regression omitting the 1992 observations to determine the
forecasting ability of the model. The regression results are
listed in Table 24. They are fairly close to the previous
Table 24: MODEL 1 REGRESSION RESULTS AFTER OMITTING THE 1992
OBSERVATIONS
Dependent Variable: LNNAVYDRS
F - Statistic: 1.876
Probability F: .1293
R - Square Value: .1394
Adjusted R - Square Value: .0768
Sample Size = 55





LNCIVMILINC - .737* -1.822
LNDRPOP - .084 - .199
DESERT - .825 -1.216
* Significant at the .1 level
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version of Model 1 (in Table 21) . The main difference is that
the sign of the natural log of the physician population
variable changes from positive to negative. The actual values
of the explanatory variables for 1992 were plugged into this
regression equation to gauge the forecasting strength of the
model. The prediction that resulted suggested that 23.27
physicians would be recruited in 1992. Fifty-one were
actually recruited, so the equation underestimated the amount
recruited by 54.37 percent. As currently specified, the model
does not hold significant predictive powers. Adding more
variables to the equations listed above would likely greatly
enhance the predictive powers.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter explains the process used to develop three
regression models. The proxy variables had flaws and the
regression models had low R2 s. There appears to be an
improvement in direct appointment recruitment when the
civilian-military pay gap narrows and/or when the number of
recruiters increases. However, the percent changes needed to
make substantial increases in the number of physicians
recruited are quite large, which suggests that direct
appointment physician recruitment may continue to be a
difficult problem.
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V. SURVEY OF DIRECT APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS
As discussed in Chapter II, no surveys were found that
dealt directly with the reasons direct appointment physicians
joined the Navy. Upon reviewing the earlier surveys conducted
with active duty physicians and interviewing experts and
practitioners in the recruiting and medical fields, some
information was obtained on the nonpecuniary factors that
might entice a physician to forego civilian income for the
Navy. Based on this information, a survey was constructed
(see Appendix C) , which incorporates reasons for joining that
had been used in previous surveys. This survey also




The survey began by asking the respondents for the
following background and demographic information:
1. gender;
2. years of active Navy service;
3. race;
4. whether or not the physician had ever been in private
practice;
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5. whether or not the physician was recalled from the
Navy Reserve and, if so, whether the recall was voluntary or
involuntary; and
6. the age at which the physician joined the Navy as a
direct appointment physician (for physicians that were
recalled, this was the age at which they were recalled from
the Navy Reserve, rather than the age that they joined through
other accession sources)
.
The survey was broken down into three basic sections. The
first section of the survey attempted to ascertain the reasons
these physicians joined the Navy by presenting them with a
list of 23 factors and asking them to select all of the items
on the list that were important reasons for their joining the
Navy. The list contained 17 factors that past surveys had
found positively influenced physicians' decisions to join the




3. family tradition of naval service;
4. pay off medical education loans;
5. Navy spouse; and
6. blank line for "other" reasons.
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It was expected that the results of the surveys would
indicate the following to be strong motivators: patriotism,
Navy lifestyle/culture, leadership challenge, professional
challenge, no personal malpractice liability, avoiding
administrative business hassles, better quality health care,
and less competitive environment than private practice/more
patient -oriented. It was also expected that paying off
medical education loans and more personal free time would be
somewhat less important motivators. The payment of medical
education loans was added to the list because some medical
school graduates or residents who have incurred large debts
may be motivated by short run earnings to pay off loans. Navy
residents earn higher salaries than their civilian
counterparts, thereby offering higher short run earnings.
Of the 23 variables that could possibly be chosen in the
first section, it was important to determine if some were more
important than others in influencing the physician's choice to
join the Navy. To this end, the second section asked which
five of the 23 listed variables were the physician's most
important reasons for joining the Navy.
The purpose of the third section of the survey was to
ascertain how physicians' opinions of Navy life and Navy
medicine have changed since they came in. The rationale was
that there may be other nonpecuniary factors that would
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positively influence physician recruitment more than those
that originally motivated these physicians to join. These
other factors could be used to motivate future recruits. The
third section attempts to determine this by asking "Now that
you have been in the Navy, what five factors from the list are
the most positive aspects of Navy life?"
B. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SURVEYS
Surveys were distributed to 161 Navy direct appointment
physicians at four naval hospitals: Naval Hospital Oakland,
California; Naval Hospital Bethesda, Maryland; Naval Hospital
San Diego, California; and Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton,
California. The four hospitals were chosen because they were
easily accessible for the researcher. Three of the four
hospitals were major teaching facilities whose physician
population is largely board certified.
Table 25 presents a breakdown of the ranks of those
physicians who received a survey. Most were very senior;
49.01 percent were captains and 36.65 percent were commanders.
Only 14.28 percent were junior officers (lieutenant or
lieutenant commander)
. The doctors who received the surveys
were from a variety of specialties, as listed in Table 26.
They ranged from hard- to- recruit specialties, such as
surgeons, to those whose incomes are more closely aligned to
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their civilian counterparts, such as family practice
physicians
.












Of the 161 surveys distributed, 106 were returned, for a
total response rate of 65.84 percent. Each of the four
individual hospitals had a response rate exceeding 50 percent.
Some of the surveys were undelivered because the physicians
were on temporary additional duty at other geographic
locations or because the physicians were no longer assigned to
the hospital or were no longer in the Navy.
Response bias may be present in this survey. Those who
elected to return the survey may not be representative of
those physicians who did not return the survey. Also, because
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Radiology / Nuclear Medicine
Urology
the survey did not target a random sample of all direct
appointment physicians in the Navy, but rather those at the
four selected hospitals, this sample may not be representative
of the total Navy direct appointment physician population.
This may especially be true if board certified physicians join
for different reasons than non-board certified physicians,
since three of the four hospitals were major teaching
facilities
.
As sometimes happens with surveys, the respondents did not
always fill out the form as requested. Six respondents filled
out only the first section with the list of 23 factors or only
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the second and third sections where they listed the five most
important factors for joining or staying. There were also
some misunderstandings about the age of accession for some
physicians who were recalls. And occasionally, the physicians
did not complete one of the biographical questions. All in
all, however, most respondents completed the survey as
intended. Forty- one respondents added "other" reasons or
added reasons to the five most important reasons for joining
or added other factors to the five most positive aspects to
Navy life. Eleven respondents took the time to add additional
comments beyond those discussed above. All of these additions
will be discussed later in this chapter.
1. Characteristics of Physicians Responding to the Survey
Table 27 displays the distribution of respondents by
gender: 18.6 percent of the respondents were female, while
81.4 percent were male. It appears that females are
overrepresented in this survey compared to their proportion in
the overall direct appointment physician population. Table 28
presents the minority representation of the respondents. At
15.2 percent, Asians are overrepresented compared to their
representation in the direct appointment physician population
as a whole. Blacks, hispanics, and whites may be
underrepresented at 2.9 percent, 2.9 percent, and 78.1
percent, respectively.
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Frequency Missing = 4





Other Minority- 1 1.0
White 82 78.1
TOTAL 105
Frequency Missing = 1
Table 29 reports the length of service distribution of
respondents. While those who received the surveys were very
senior in rank, 38.1 percent of the respondents had less than
10 years of service. The higher ranks can most likely be
explained by creditable service for civilian education and
experience that is granted to many physicians.
75
Table 3 identifies whether or not the respondent was
in private practice; 61.3 percent of this sample said they had
been in private practice, while 3 8.7 percent said they had
not. Table 31 shows how many physicians were recalled, and if
recalled, whether the recall was voluntary or involuntary; of
those who returned the survey, 74.29 percent were not recalled
from the Naval Reserve, 21.9 percent were voluntary recalls
and 3.81 percent were involuntary recalls.
Table 29: SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY YEARS OF SERVICE




- 4 16 15.2 16 15.2
5 - 9 24 22.9 40 38.1
10 - 14 31 29.5 71 67.6
15 - 19 22 21.0 93 88.6
20 - 24 10 9.5 103 98.1
25 - 29 1 1.0 104 99.9
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Frequency Missing = 1
2. First Section of the Survey: List of 23 Possible
Reasons for Joining the Navy
Table 32 lists the 23 factors mentioned in the first
section of the survey and reports the numbers and percentages
of physicians who indicated the factor was or was not a reason
they joined the Navy. Of the 23 factors, only one,
patriotism, was given as a reason for joining by a majority,
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Table 32: FREQUENCY OF RESPONSES TO THE 23 FACTORS LISTED AS
REASONS FOR JOINING THE NAVY
Selected as a reason Not selected as a reason
Factor Number Percent Number Percent
Patriotism 66 61.9 51 48.1
Other 44 41.6 62 58.6
Military Lifestyle/Culture 43 40.6 63 69.4
Professional Challenge 43 40.6 63 59.4
Professional Development 42 39.6 64 60.4
Avoid Administrative Business Hassles 40 37.7 66 62.3
More Personal Free Time 38 35.8 68 64.2
Military Retirement 37 34.9 69 66.1
Travel 36 34.0 70 66.0
Graduate Medical Education 30 28.3 76 71.7
Less Competitive Environment than
Private Practice: more Patient-Oriented
29 27.4 77 72.6
No Personal Malpractice Liability 28 26.4 78 73.6
Pursue Specialty 26 24.6 80 76.6
Leadership Development 26 23.6 81 76.4
Job Security 23 21.7 83 78.3
30 Days Leave 18 17.0 88 83.0
Special Pays 16 14.2 91 85.8
Family Tradition of Naval Service 13 12.3 93 87.7
Better Quality Health Care 10 9.4 96 90.6
Promotion 7 6.6 99 93.4
Military Pay 6 5.7 100 94.3
Navy Spouse 3 2.8 103 97.2
Pay Off Medical Education Loans 2 1.9 104 98.1
51.9 percent, of the respondents. At 41.5 percent of the
respondents, the second most frequently listed reason was
"other." Military lifestyle/culture and professional
challenge were each given as reasons for joining by 40.6
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percent of the respondents. Professional development was
given by 3 9.6 percent of respondents as a reason and avoiding
administrative business hassles was given by 3 7.7 percent.
"More personal free time" was chosen by 3 8.5 percent as a
reason and military retirement was chosen by 34.9 percent.
Thirty- four percent gave travel as a reason while 2 8.3 percent
indicated that graduate medical education was a reason. "The
less competitive environment /more patient -oriented than
private practice" was cited as a factor influencing 27.4
percent to join while 26.4 percent indicated that no personal
malpractice liability was a reason. Fewer than 25 percent of
the respondents chose the remaining factors as reasons for
joining.
3. Second Section of the Survey: List of the Pive Most
Important Reasons for Joining the Navy
Table 33 presents factors that were mentioned most
frequently as being among the five most important reasons for
joining. Most frequently mentioned was patriotism, at 44.34
percent, followed by professional development and avoiding
administrative business hassles (both at 34.91 percent).
Also, among those most frequently mentioned were professional
challenge, 32.08 percent; military retirement, 2 8.3 percent;
military lifestyle/culture, 27.36 percent; more personal free
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time, 2 7.36 percent; other reasons, 27.36 percent; and
graduate medical education, 25.47 percent.








Professional Challenge 34 32.08




More Personal Free Time 29 27.36
Other 29 27.36
Graduate Medical Education 27 25.47
4. Third Section of Survey: List of Five Most Positive
Aspects of Navy Life
Table 34 presents the most frequently given responses
to the five most positive aspects of Navy life once the
physician is in the service. Military retirement was given by
36.79 percent of the respondents, followed by professional
development and professional challenge, both at 3 3.96 percent.
Patriotism was listed by 32.08 percent of the respondents,
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more personal free time by 30.19 percent and graduate medical
education by 27.36 percent. No personal malpractice liability
was given by 2 5.47 percent of respondents, and avoiding
administrative business hassles and military lifestyle/culture
both received a 24.53 percent response rate.
Table 34: MOST FREQUENT RESPONSES TO THE FIVE MOST POSITIVE
ASPECTS OF NAVY LIFE
Factor Number Percentage
Military Retirement 39 36.79
Professional Development 36 33.96
Professional Challenge 36 33.96
Patriotism 34 32.08
More Personal Free Time 32 30.19










5. Comparison Between Recalled and Nonrecalled Physicians
Because the recruiting command is no longer recruiting
Naval Reserve physicians to active duty, the responses to the
first section were compared between recalls and nonrecalls
(see Table 35) to see if there were any significant
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Table 35: COMPARISON BETWEEN NAVY RESERVE RECALLS' AND NON-
RECALLS' REASONS FOR JOINING THE NAVY
Nonrecalls Recalls
Selected as a reason Not selected as a
reason
Selected as a reason Not selected as a
reason
Factor Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Patriotism 41 62.6 37 47.4 14 61.9 13 48.1
Other 28 36.9 60 64.1 16 66.6 12 44.4
Military Lifestyle/Culture 31 39.7 47 60.3 12 44.4 16 56.6
Professional Challenge 29 37.2 49 62.8 14 51.9 13 48.1
Professional Development 29 37.2 49 62.8 13 48.1 14 61.9
Avoid Administrative Business
Hassles
31 39.7 47 60.3 9 33.3 18 66.7
More Personal Free Time 30 38.6 48 61.6 8 29.6 19 70.4
Military Retirement 24 30.8 64 69.2 13 48.1 14 51.9
Travel 30 38.6 48 61.6 6 22.2 21 77.8
Graduate Medical Education 24 30.8 64 69.2 6 18.6 22 81.6
Less Competitive Environment than
Private Practice: more Patient-
Oriented
24 30.8 64 69.2 5 18.6 22 81.6
No Personal Malpractice Liability 22 28.2 66 71.8 6 22.2 21 77.8
Pursue Specialty 21 26.9 67 73.1 5 18.6 22 81.6
Leadership Development 21 26.9 67 73.1 4 14.8 23 86.2
Job Security 17 21.8 61 78.2 6 22.2 21 77.8
30 Days Leave 15 19.2 63 80.8 3 11.1 24 88.9
Special Pays 11 14.1 67 86.9 4 14.8 23 86.2
Family Tradition of Naval Service 8 10.3 70 89.7 6 18.6 22 81.6
Better Quality Health Care 10 12.8 68 87.2 0.0 27 100.0
Promotion 5 6.4 73 93.6 2 7.4 26 92.6
Military Pay 6 6.4 73 93.6 1 3.7 26 96.3
Navy Spouse 3 3.8 76 96.2 0.0 27 100.0
Pay Off Medical Education Loans 1 1.3 77 9.8 1 3.7 26 96.3
TOTAL 27 78
Frequency Missing = 1
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differences between the two groups. Unfortunately, with only
27 recalled physicians, Table 35 does not provide sufficient
sample sizes for a reliable comparison. Nonetheless, any
differences between the two types of physicians that stand out
may be indicative of an important factor.
From this sample, physicians who were recalled gave
more "other" reasons than did nonrecalled physicians, 55.6
percent versus 3 5.9 percent. This may be because their prior
service has made recalls more aware of different benefits of
naval service. Recalls were more likely to indicate
professional challenge than nonrecalls, at 51.9 percent versus
37.2 percent. Recalls were also more inclined to indicate
professional development than nonrecalls, 48.1 percent versus
37.2 percent. Recalls listed retirement as a reason more
often, with a 48.1 percent response rate compared to
nonrecalls, at 30.8 percent. This makes sense, as recalls
already have time invested in the Navy toward retirement.
On the other hand, nonrecalls were more likely to
indicate more personal free time, at 3 8.5 percent, than were
recalls, at 29.6 percent. Nonrecalls were also more likely to
indicate graduate medical education, 3 0.8 percent, than
recalls, 18.5 percent. Nonrecalls mentioned pursuing their
specialty more often than recalls, at 26.9 and 18.5 percent,
respectively. Nonrecalls indicated the less competitive
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environment /more patient -oriented factor more often than
recalls, 30.8 percent versus 18.5 percent. And more
nonrecalls indicated leadership development, 2 6.9 percent,
than recalls, 14.8 percent. Surprisingly, no recalled
physicians indicated better quality health care, while 12.8
percent of nonrecalls did.
6 . Comparison of Physicians Who Had Been in Private
Practice and Physicians Who Had Not
One interesting area to explore was to determine
whether the reasons for joining were different for those who
had been in private practice than for those who had not.
Table 36 provides such a comparison, using the first section
of the survey. This time the comparison was a little more
evenly weighted, with 65 physicians having been in private
practice, while 41 had not been.
Those physicians who had been in private practice were
more likely to indicate avoiding administrative business
hassles, 41.5 percent, than were those who had not been in
private practice, 31.7 percent. Those physicians who had been
in private practice were also more likely to indicate more
personal free time, 41.5 percent, than those who had not, 26.8
percent. The private practice doctors also cited the less
competitive environment/more patient -oriented factor more
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Table 36: COMPARISON BETWEEN PHYSICIANS WHO HAVE BEEN IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE TO THOSE WHO HAVE NOT
Had been in Private Practice Had NOT Been in Private Practice
Selected as a reason Not selected as a
reason
Selected as a reason Not selected as a
reason
Factor Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Patriotism 36 56.4 29 44.6 19 46.3 22 63.7
Other 26 40.0 39 60.0 18 43.9 23 66.1
Military Lifestyle/Culture 28 43.1 37 56.9 15 36.6 26 63.4
Professional Challenge 28 43.1 37 66.9 15 36.6 26 63.4
Professional Development 22 33.8 43 66.2 20 48.8 21 61.2
Avoid Administrative Business
Hassles
27 41.6 38 58.6 13 31.7 28 68.3
More Personal Free Time 27 41.6 38 68.6 11 26.8 30 73.2
Military Retirement 24 36.9 41 63.1 13 31.7 28 68.3
Travel 20 30.8 46 69.2 16 39.0 26 61.0
Graduate Medical Education 17 26.2 48 73.8 13 31.7 28 68.3
Less Competitive Environment
than
Private Practice: more Patient
Oriented
22 33.8 43 66.2 7 17.1 34 82.9
No Personal Malpractice Liability 16 24.6 49 76.4 12 29.3 29 70.7
Pursue Specialty 13 20.0 62 80.0 13 31.7 28 68.3
Leadership Development 11 16.9 64 83.1 14 34.1 27 66.9
Job Security 13 20.0 62 80.0 10 24.4 31 76.6
30 Days Leave 13 20.0 62 80.0 6 12.2 36 87.8
Special Pays 10 16.4 66 84.6 6 12.2 36 87.8
Family Tradition of Naval Service 9 13.8 66 86.2 4 9.8 37 90.2
Better Quality Health Care 4 6.2 61 93.8 6 14.6 36 86.4
Promotion 6 7.7 60 92.3 2 4.9 39 96.1
Military Pay 3 4.6 62 96.4 3 7.3 38 92.7
Navy Spouse 2 3.1 63 96.9 1 2.4 40 97.6
Pay Off Medical Education Loans 1 1.6 64 98.6 1 2.4 40 97.6
TOTAL 66 41
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often than the non-private practice doctors, 33.8 percent
compared to 17.1 percent.
Those who had not been in private practice were more
likely to indicate professional development, 48.8 percent,
than those who had been in private practice, 33.8 percent.
They were also more likely to indicate pursuing their
specialty, 31.7 percent, than were those who had been in
private practice, 20 percent. And finally, those who had not
been in private practice were more likely to indicate
leadership development, 34.1 percent, than those who had been
in private practice, 16.9 percent.
7. Other Factors Given for Joining the Navy and Listed as
Positive Aspects of Navy Life
Table 3 7 provides the other reasons for joining and
staying given by the physicians who either filled in the
"other" blank or wrote in comments in the space provided for
listing the five most important reasons for joining and the
five most positive aspects of Navy life. Because three of the
four hospitals were teaching facilities, it is not surprising
that nine people mentioned the ability to teach and work in an
academic environment, and five people mentioned research.
Table 3 8 presents additional comments made by survey
respondents. Most responses pointed to the negative side E
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Table 37 : OTHER REASONS GIVEN FOR JOINING THE NAVY OR OTHER
POSITIVE ASPECTS OF NAVY LIFE
Factor Number Indicat no
Ability to Teach/Academic Environment 9
Location, including specific geographic areas (i.e., San Diego, Japan! or general geographic
conditions (i.e., warm water ports, overseas)
9
Berry Plan/Draft/Vietnam 6
Research {i.e., Clinical Research, HIV) 5
Nontraditional Medicine (Flight Surgeon, Undersea Medicine) 6
Patient Population (i.e., military patients, patients have free access to medical care) 3
Esprit de Corps 2
Prior Service Experience 2
The Uniform 2
THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE GIVEN BY ONLY ONE RESPONDENT EACH:
Practice subspecialty
Self imposed "thank you" to U.S.A.
Guaranteed equal pay for equal work/active nondiscrimination policy
Guilt over leaving just as Desert Storm hit (voluntary recall)
Role model for younger female medical corps officers
Influence of a mentor
Personal challenge




Did not have to commit to group practice, then leave them for a fellowship when they would have expected me to stay on
Interesting Opportunities (positive aspect of Navy life)
Set the pace in managed care and healthcare management
Professional colleagues second to none
None of these (referring to the positive aspects of Navy life)
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Table 3 8 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM SURVEY RESPONDENTS
GENERAL COMMENTS
1 am getting out. 1 find it less than pleasant.
Overall-the benefits have outweighed the disadvantages of being in the Navy
The pay is not adequate to the work
l...have had a variety of very interesting and satisfying assignments. 1 am personally quite satisfied with the USN experience but 1 know of many
colleagues who have had adverse experiences which should have been avoidable. 1 myself have had many run-ins with the bureaucratic mindset of
many people within the USN, but 1 have been able to satisfactorily work around much of the aggravation. Many others have not had either the
patience, or the desire to put up with some of the USN unique problems associated with providing medical care. 1 believe many aspects of medical
practice within the USN system are desirable; with some modifications, the system can be made even more attractive to meoical provider...
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE WRITTEN NEXT TO A FACTOR
Factor Comments
Travel And Faster
30 days leave A very negative factor - 1 had over 60 days per year in private practice
Military pay Less than 60% of private practice income. Diminishing
Less Competitive Environment than private practice: more
patient-oriented
Definitely not a true statement. When kids grown reentered service-change of
career largely to enter major teaching facility-couldn't do this after 10 years of
Army command tenure (this physician served as an army physician prior to
entering civilian practice)
Better Quality Health Care Based upon training in civilian medical community
Graduate Medical Education Not Available. Higher pay than civilian
Special Pays Poor, Diminishing
Avoid Administrative Business Hassles No longer avoid administrative hassles. On cutting edge of Total Quality
Leadership, Quality Assurance, Joint Commission for the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organization and healthcare management. More paperwork now.
Worse than private practice.
More personal Free Time None. No one 1 know has more personal free time. Our physicians average 60-
80 hour weeks, gladly, because they are dedicated to a quality practice.
Travel Saudi, Somalia??
Job Security None
Navy life and Navy medicine, though a few had positive
comments to make.
8. Summary
As expected, patriotism, military lifestyle/culture,
professional challenge, avoiding administrative business
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hassles, more personal free time, less competitive environment
than private practice/more patient -oriented, and no personal
malpractice liability were most frequently mentioned as
reasons for joining the Navy. However, leadership development
was not as frequently mentioned as anticipated, while graduate
medical education, military retirement, travel, professional
development, and "other" reasons were mentioned more often
than anticipated.
When comparing recalled physicians to nonrecalled
physicians, recalled physicians more frequently indicated more
personal free time, graduate medical education, travel, less
competitive environment than private practice/more patient
-
oriented, and better quality health care; nonrecalled
physicians more frequently indicated "other" reasons,
professional challenge, professional development and military
retirement. When comparing private practice physicians to
those who had not been in private practice, private practice
physicians more frequently indicated that avoiding
administrative business hassles, more personal free time, and
less competitive environment /more patient -oriented were
reasons for joining the Navy. On the other hand, physicians
who had not been in private practice more frequently responded
that professional development and leadership development were
reasons for joining.
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Once again, however, it bears repeating that this
survey may not be representative of Navy direct appointment
physicians as a whole because of selectivity bias and because
it was not a random sample. It would be interesting to take
the input given in Tables 37 and 38, redesign the survey, and
distribute the survey to a random sample of all direct
appointment physicians to see if more can be discovered about




VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The results of this thesis clearly support the quote from
Lerro, et. al .
,
(1989) which began this thesis about the
difficulty of recruiting direct appointment physicians. The
regression analysis supports the hypothesis that, if the pay
gap between military and civilian physicians narrows, or if
the number of recruiters increases, that the number of direct
appointment physicians recruited will increase, all else
constant. However, to recruit 25 more physicians annually,
the pay gap would have to decrease anywhere from 31.57 to
40.45 percent. Likewise, an annual increase of 25 physicians
would require an increase in the total number of recruiters of
26.4 percent or an increase in the number of nurse corps
recruiters of 46.17 percent, all else held constant. There do
not, however, seem to be any strong nonpecuniary factors which
affect direct appointment physician recruitment. Only one
factor, patriotism, was indicated by a majority of survey
respondents as a reason for joining the Navy, and that was by




Major improvements in this thesis would involve two
projects; (1) improving the regression forecasting model, and
(2) revising the survey.
1. Improve the Regression Model
The regression analysis can be improved by increasing
the forecasting accuracy of existing proxy variables and
including additional variables in the model.
a. Improving Existing Variables in the Model
(1) Number of Observations . The regression can be
greatly improved if the number of observations were increased
by using recruiting districts vice recruiting areas. This may
be possible if the American Medical Association (AMA) will
provide the physician income and malpractice liability data
used by Gonzalez (1987, 1989, and 1992) grouped by county or
even by state rather than by census divisions.
(2) Military Pay. The accuracy of the military pay
proxy can be increased if the measures of VHA, MORB, and MSP
are included. This would allow more precise measurement of
the impact of special pays and bonuses on recruitment.
(3) Physician Population. The physician population
variable would more accurately reflect the military supply
market if it were restricted to the number of physicians under
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the age of 45. These data are available in Roback, et. al
.
,
(1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990, and 1992) .
b. Adding Additional Variables to the Model
(1) Advertising. As discussed in Chapter IV, the
amount spent on advertising for direct appointment physicians
is a function of the total amount available for Navy-
advertising and the recruiting goals for direct appointment
physicians. The goals and the amounts spent on direct
appointment physicians for the years 1988 to 1992 were
obtained for this thesis, but these two alone were not enough
to accurately estimate the amount spent from 1981 to 1987. An
accurate value for the earlier years could be estimated if the
total amount spent on Navy advertising from 1988 to 1992 were
known. Adding an estimate for the advertising dollars spent
could improve the regression's accuracy.
(2) Real Income of the Population. Increases in
the real income of the population may increase the demand for
physicians and thus increase physician income. Adding a
variable to measure changes in real income for the district or
area population may improve the predictive power of the
regression equation.
(3) Local Medical Community. Physicians have
expressed preferences for the locations that have a strong
medical community (i.e., practicing physicians, group
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practices, and hospitals) (Stone and Turner, 1992) . A proxy-
variable for the number of hospitals and medical practices
could help to measure the impact of the local medical
community and improve the regression model. It is unclear,
however, where such information could be obtained, but perhaps
the AMA keeps such data.
(4) Individual Civilian Data. If individual
physician vice aggregate data could by obtained on civilian
physicians from the AMA or other sources, this data could be
compared to Navy direct appointment physicians to see how the
civilian and military populations differ. Additionally a
logit regression could be built to see if the decision to join
by physicians could be predicted given the factors already






3. home town5 ;
4. location of medical school, intern and residency
programs
.
5 Physicians have shown a preference for locations close
to family.
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2. Revise and Redistribute Survey
a. Revisions
Add the following as possible reasons for joining
the Navy in section one of the survey:
1. opportunities to teach;
2. research opportunities;
3. Berry Plan/draft;
4. location of Navy hospitals;
5. location of Navy duty stations;
6. esprit de corps;
7. patient population;




10. not having to commit to group practice, free to leave
for a fellowship opportunity;
11. set the pace in managed care;
12. professional colleagues.
Jb. Redistribute Surveys
Redistribute the surveys to all Navy direct
appointment physicians to obtain a more representative sample.
There will still be response bias as a 100 percent response
rate cannot be guaranteed. But the responses should be more
representative of the population as a whole. These changes
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will be crucial to understanding the strength of nonpecuniary
factors affecting military affiliation by physician.
Together, the regression model and the survey will provide
complementary information that will assist in understanding




This thesis realigns the recruiting areas and districts
from 1981 to 1992 in a way that most closely resembles the
current geographic configuration. This was done so that the
results of this thesis would be more useful for current
recruiting managers. It should be noted that the changes
listed below are not all of the changes made to the NRD's from
1981 to 1992. There are other NRD's that have not recruited
more than one physician from 1981 to 1992, so changes in these
districts were not of concern for this thesis. Only NRD's
that recruited more than one physician were used in this
thesis, so only those NRD changes affecting physician
recruitment are listed below.
The NRD's that have been eliminated are listed below in
Table 39, along with the current NRD that absorbed the area.
Two NRD's, 52 6 and 32 6, were absorbed into two other NRD's,
314 and 316. The PORTS data were not clear on which portion
of NRD 526 went to 314 and which went to 316, and likewise
which portion of NRD 326 went to NRD 314 and which went to
316. These NRD's were realigned using odd and even fiscal
years to arbitrarily assign a portion of each district to NRD
314 and a portion to NRD 316.
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Table 39: REALIGNMENT OF NAVY RECRUITING DISTRICTS THAT
RECRUITED MORE THAN ONE PHYSICIAN FROM 1981 TO 1992













52 6 (odd FY's) 316
526 (even FY's) 314
326 (FY 90) 314
326 (FY 91) 316
Source: Navy Recruiting Command
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APPENDIX B
EXPLANATION OF COLUMN HEADINGS ON TABLE III
FY 93 Military Pay - Based on a modal military physician using
weighted average for 03-06. Includes base pay, basic
allowance for quarter, basic allowance for subsistence,
variable housing allowance, variable special pay, board
certified pay, and additional special pay.
FY 93 4 Year MSP - Multi-year Specialty Pay. Replace MORB.
Varies by specialty and length of obligation from
two to four years.
FY 93 ISP - Incentive Special Pay
Estimated Civilian Pay - Estimated civilian pay for 1993 of
employed physicians. Employers are hospitals, group
practices, and health maintenance organizations.
Partnership distributions and other such nonsalaried,
monetary payments are excluded.
Total Pay Gap - Civilian pay minus total military pay.




SURVEY OF DIRECT APPOINTMENT PHYSICIANS'
REASONS FOR JOINING THE NAVY
The information on this survey will be used for research in
recruiting direct appointment physicians. Your answers will be
kept strictly confidential.
Please circle or fill in the blank
Gender: Male Female Years of Active Navy Service
Race: Asian Black Hispanic White Other
Have you ever been in private practice? yes no
Were you a recall from the U.S. Naval Reserve? yes no
If yes, were you: Voluntary Recall Involuntary Recall
Age When Joined the Navy as Direct Appointment Physician
_
Note: For those recalled from the Reserves, please give age
at which you were recalled.
iWhich of the following were reasons you joined the Navy as a
direct appointment physician? Circle all that apply.































v. Less Competitive Environment Than Private
Practice: More Patient Oriented
w. Other
From the list above, what were the five most important reasons
you joined the Navy?
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Now that you're in the Navy which five items from the list above
do you consider to be the most positive aspects of Navy life?
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
i nn
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